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Basel and Securitization: 
Conflicting Incentives and Rationales*
David Augusto Echeverry Botero **
Abstract
The financial crisis presented in 2007 has a number of similar factors with the 1929 crisis; an 
environment of economic deregulation preceded both. There are in banking systems a series of 
incentives and rationales that, depending on the position occupied in the financial market, are 
constantly in conflict with the regulation and with the principles set out in Basel for the proper 
functioning of the system.
Consequently under the creation of new mechanisms, such as the securization or the futures 
market, the incentives will greatly influence the financial market actors, to not comply with their 
obligations (Basel I, II, and III), because they could achieve greater profit for them and for the 
institutions they work for. Therefore the measures contained in Basel III, as a reaction from the 
financial crisis (based primarily on increasing risk capital and reduce leverage), could if not accom-
panied by an effective policy control, will not be efficient in the long term to control the market, so 
may be a new economic crisis will occur.
Keywords: Basel, incentives, securitization, rationales, leverage, venture capital, risk qualifiers, 
rational agent, liquidity, systemic risk, credit risk.
Resumen
La crisis financiera presentada en el 2007 reviste una serie de factores similares a lo que generó la 
crisis de 1929, precedidas por un ambiente de desregulación económica. Existen entonces dentro 
Recepción del Articulo: 2 de julio de 2014
Aprobación del Articulo: 2 de septiembre de 2014
* This article was a product of the investigation due at the University of Melbourne under the master program 
of Commercial law, made for the subject of Banking and finance Law. The Investigation finished in 2013.
** Abogado de la Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Magister en derecho Económico de esta misma Universidad, 
y Master of Commercial Law (LL.M) de la Universidad de Melbourne. Docente de la Maestría en derecho 
Económico de la Universidad Javeriana en las materias de Investigación científica y Seminario de investigación. 
Se desempeña igualmente como docente de las materias de Derecho Comercial General y Derecho Comunitario 
e integración económica en la Universidad Politécnico Grancolombiano. Ha sido litigante y asesor en varios 
procesos contractuales, señalando su participación en el grupo que realizó el estudio sobre la viabilidad 
económica y financiera de la flota mercante Grancolombiana y la empresa con el mismo nombre, también 
fue asesor en el proceso de TELECOM - PAR - en liquidación contra PLESCOM. Ha desempeñado funciones 
administrativas y de gestión en el Parlamento Andino y el Instituto de Altos Estudios para la Integración y el 
Desarrollo Legislativo - IDL. Correo Electrónico: davidaugustoecheverry@yahoo.es
Basel and securitization: conflicting incentives and rationales
18 Verba Iuris 33 • enero - junio 2015  • pp. 17-36  •  Bogotá D.C. Colombia • ISSN: 0121-3474
de los sistemas bancarios una serie de incentivos y racionalidades que, dependiendo de la posición 
que se ocupe dentro del mercado financiero, están constantemente en conflicto con la regulación y 
en especial con los principios establecidos en Basilea para el correcto funcionamiento del sistema.
En consecuencia al presentarse nuevos mecanismos de negocios, como la titulación o el mercado 
de futuros, estos incentivos van a influenciar enormemente en los agentes del mercado financiero, 
para que incumplan sus obligaciones (Basilea I, II, y III). Así logran una mayor ganancia tanto para 
ellos como para las instituciones a las que pertenecen. 
Por lo anterior las medidas contenidas en Basilea III, que se basan principalmente en aumentar 
el capital de riesgo y disminuir el apalancamiento, si no se acompañan con una política de control 
efectiva, teniendo en cuenta los incentivos y al agente racional dentro del mercado, no van a ser efi-
cientes en el largo plazo, siendo posible que se produzca una nueva crisis económica, si se encuentra 
un nuevo instrumento financiero apto para ello.
Palabras clave: Basilea, incentivos, titularización, racionalidades, apalancamiento, capital de 
riesgo, capital mínimo requerido, calificadores del riesgo, agente racional, liquidez, riesgo sistémico, 
riesgo.
I. Introduction
The 2007 financial crisis showed that in secu-
ritisation there are misalignments, different 
incentives and rationales between the agents 
of the transaction.1 However, the revised 
documents do not analyse how, in securiti-
zation, there are other incentives that comes 
from the nature of the banking business and 
the economic rationale, and how those diffe-
rent incentives are conflicting with Basel and 
the rationale behind Basel’s principles.
This research aims to find how the 2007 
crisis started and why Basel I and II was not 
enough to prevent it. Also aims to analyse the 
1 See i.e. J Mitchell and I Fender, ´The future of 
securitisation: how to align incentives?´, BIS 
Quarterly Review, September 2009; Joint Forum, 
´Report on Asset Securitization Incentives´, Bank 
for International Settlements, July 2011, p 9-18; 
D Munoz, ´SEC v Goldman Sachs and the new 
Wave of (Asset-Backed) Securities Litigation. 
What are the Arguments? What is at Stake?´, 
[2010] LFMR 413-420; S Schwarcs, ´ The Future of 
Securitization´, (2009) 41 Conn L Rev 1315-1325
new measures implemented by Bassel III as a 
reaction to the crisis, and find out if they are 
enough to prevent another crisis in the future. 
In order to do that, this paper will describe 
how the securization works, then review the 
main meausures to protect financial consu-
mers and then analyse Basel III changes. 
In the face of securitization, it is possible 
to find three unexposed incentives that 
conflict with Basel rationale. There are (i) 
the incentive of profit maximization of the 
Banks and other participants in the market, 
(ii) the incentive of profit maximization of 
the Bank’s employees, and (iii) the incentive 
to take higher risks for biggest banks since, 
as their paramount importance in the finan-
cial markets, governments cannot let them 
default or bankrupt. These three incentives 
determine the bank’s behaviour in the market 
and the use of complex and creative vehicles, 
as securitization.
Under basic economic rationale, any 
participant in a market is driven to maximize 
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their own benefits. This is the more basic 
and powerful incentive and the engine of 
the capitalist economies, in which the par-
ticipants in the markets create business to 
achieve that purpose. Banks and other finan-
cial institutions are Businesses and therefore 
driven by that purpose.
In the same way, bank´s employees and 
other participants have the incentive to 
maximize their own profit. Their profit 
usually, as seen in the 2007 financial crisis, 
is attached to the more financial products 
they sell to the most people in the shortest 
time, without taking into account within the 
metric if the sale may generate a future risk 
to the stability of the bank. (Bank for Inter-
national Settlements, 2011 p 6 par 27) ‘Many 
of the market participants interviewed 
agreed that compensation for employees in 
the financial institutions and the model for 
revenue generation led to systematic misa-
lignments.’ (Joint Forum, 2011, p 14)
Finally, biggest banks, treated in Basel as 
Global systemically important banks, are 
aware of their importance in the financial 
system. Therefore Governments have to 
come in their rescue if they are in problems 
because their bankruptcy represents a very 
big problem to the economy of those cou-
ntries. Consequently they have an incentive 
to be less careful and to involve in riskier 
segments. (Bank for International Settle-
ments, 2011, p 1-2 par 3)
In contrast, Basel principles and require-
ments were created to protect consumer’s 
deposits, granting that banks have the 
sufficient strength to make loans, under 
certain conditions, that would not com-
promise the consumer’s money. That is the 
rationale behind the capital, buffers and 
leverage requirement: ensure that the bank 
can respond with its obligations. (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2011)
This work intends to explain how this 
conflict affected securitization in the con-
text of the 2007 financial crisis, exhibit the 
most important measures taken in Basel III 
to correct that problem, and expose how 
other financial vehicles would be affected by 
the same conflict in the future. In other to 
do that in the first part it will explain what 
is securitization, how it works and how the 
incentives affected it. In the second part 
analyse Basel III reforms as response to 
those incentives, and finally in the conclu-
sion explain how the unresolved conflict 
could generate another financial crisis if 
banks and control agencies are not effective 
in the implementation of Basel III.
II. Securitization and incentives
A. How Securitization Works
To understand how the described incentives 
affect securitization, is necessary understand 
what is securitization in the first place
‘Securitization is a financial technique in 
which the cash flow from an underlying pool 
of assets is used to service at least two tran-
ches of notes reflecting different degrees of 
risk. A key aspect of securitization is that the 
creditworthiness of the notes is de-linked 
from the credit risk of the originator.’ (JJ de 
Vries Robbé, 2008, p 3)
This financial technique or financial ins-
trument has inherent flexibility that allows 
the banks, when they act as originators, to 
produce different kind of negotiable products 
for investors, while them ‘freed up’ capital to 
be applied to other transactions. (Ibid)
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Securitization basically has three elements 
or characteristics: 
‘(1) pooling of assets (either cash-based or 
synthetically created); (2) delinking of the 
credit risk of the collateral asset pool from 
that of the originator, usually through the 
transfer of the underlying assets to a finite-
lived, standalone special purpose vehicle 
(SPV); and (3) trenching of liabilities (i.e. 
issuance of claims with different levels of 
seniority) that are backed by the asset pool.’ 
(Mitchell and Fender, 2009, page 29)
In this context the basic participants in a 
securitization are (i) an originator, who crea-
tes the assets that are going to into the pool, 
(ii) an arranger, who structure the transac-
tion, and is in charge to sell the notes to the 
investors (the originator and the arranger 
when a bank is involved, can be the same 
person), (iii) special purpose vehicle which 
‘(…) insulates the note holders from the 
credit risk of the originator.’ (Vries Robbé, 
2008, p 14)
As in securitization the credit risk is trans-
ferred from the banks to the investors, it is 
important to define credit risk ‘(…) which 
is the risk that a counterparty, whether a 
participant or other entity, will be unable 
to meet fully its financial obligations when 
due, or at any time in the future.’ (Bank for 
international settlements, 2012, p 19)
There are more participants which have 
their own roles in securitization. As shown 
in the graphic below they complement the 
transaction and make it possible. However, 
from the graphic is easy to notice how 
Graph 1
Source J Mitchell and I Fender, ‘The future of securitisation: how to align incentives?’ September 2009, BIS Quar-
terly Review, page 31
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complex is this vehicle and how hard is to 
understand the risks of it.
The assets that are going into the pool are 
receivables. The receivables are those kinds 
of rights that the creditor has and gives him 
the possibility to receive interest payments 
in instalments (i.e. book of debts or mort-
gages) for a loans, goods sold or services 
rendered, that he has made to third parties. 
(Vries Robbé, 2008, p 20). One of the main 
characteristics of the receivables is that it 
grants a cash-flow to the creditor until the 
loan is totally paid.
In this context securitization, related 
with banks, works as following: The bank 
is the creditor of some monetary rights 
because of their normal business operation. 
Those loans are receivables in its balance 
sheet. Being loans, it has an inner credit risk 
of default from the debtors. Because of that, 
are affecting the leverage ratios, buffers and 
consuming capital, as required by Basel, 
something that limits the banks possibility 
to make other loans or investments. 
Nevertheless those receivables are assets 
which can be transferred to a special purpose 
vehicle to make the pool of assets, basis of 
the securitization, and liberate resources to 
make other investments or loans. As banks 
can be arrangers, it is a win-win business to 
make a securitization based on its receivables 
since banks, in one hand, liberate resources 
by transferring its credit risk to the investors 
allowing them to make other investments 
that would generate profits, an in the other 
hand, are charging fees for arranging the 
operation.
After going into the pool, those recei-
vables constitute the collateral of the 
securitization. Then the tradable notes are 
created based on the pool of assets. Finally 
those notes will be selling in the capital mar-
kets to investors. 
In the Capital markets, it is important for 
the investors to have a rating of the notes 
as key information for their investment 
decision. That is where the rating agencies 
come into play. The rating agency makes an 
opinion evaluating the credit risk and the 
securitization structure and qualifies the 
notes where the maximum score is AAA. 
(Mitchell and Fender, 2009)
In securitization it is possible to obtain a 
better ranking of the notes as a consequence 
of the separation of the collateral from the 
originator
‘The process of securitisation leads to a sepa-
ration of the assets from the credit quality of 
the originator. It allows smaller institutions, 
unrated corporations, or those with a non-
investment grade credit rating, to access 
the capital markets based solely on the 
credit quality of the collateral they originate. 
Through securitisation, these entities may 
be able to access financing rates appropriate 
for “AAA” credits.’ (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2011, p 10)
Even though the agencies are directly 
influencing investors’ decisions with their 
opinions and qualifications, they produce 
this analysis usually by request of the origi-
nator who is, in most of the cases, the same 
who pays the agencies fees. 
As agencies’ rankings are only opinions, 
it does not take away the investors’ burden 
of due diligence in their investments. Inves-
tors’ due diligence implies that even if the 
ranking is reliable, when they are facing 
complex transactions, they shall take into 
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account other issues that affect the risk of 
the notes as transferability, regulation, taxes, 
confidentiality or securities inter alia. 
The ranking of the notes depends on the 
‘waterfall’. The ‘waterfall’ is a priority of pay-
ments, (Vries Robbé, 2008, p 27) ‘(…) a set of 
covenants dictating the ranking of interest 
and principal payments and the allocation 
of loss among investors.’ (Ibid, p 48) In this 
context the risk of the upper tranches (junior 
or mezzanine, see i.e. the graphic1 above) 
depends on the lower tranches so, in cases 
of default, they are the first in assume the 
losses, and only until the lower tranche has 
finished their collaterals, the upper tranches 
start to have a loss.
After the division of the notes in tran-
ches, the upper ones can have a very good 
ranking and achieve most of the times the 
AAA qualification. However is important 
to take into account that the ranking of the 
notes are also based in econometric models 
which depend sometimes in historic data. 
(Schwarcz, 2009)
In this context securitization provide 
benefits: (i) ‘(…) securitization provide a 
diversification of funding sources and lower 
funding cost (…)’ (Joint Forum, July 2011, p 
10) (ii) make available stable resources that 
can be found in capital markets, (Ibid) (iii) 
permits other institution, that sometimes 
are not big enough to access to the capital 
markets when they have a good collateral, 
(Ibid) (iv) makes possible for the collateral 
holder to change a non-liquid asset into a 
liquid asset to rise founds, (Ibid) (v) could 
be used as a risk manage tool, and (vi) 
provide to the investors’ with different kind 
of notes that would represent a portfolio 
diversification. (Ibid, p. 12)
B. How Incentives Affected 
Securitization in the financial 
crisis
1. Maximization of the Bank’s and 
Financial Institution Profits Skip-
ping Basel
Under Basel rationale, the use of a financial 
vehicle (i.e. securitization) to translocate the 
credit risk to investors’, and/or translocate 
it to other financial institutions, specific 
purposes vehicles or shadow bankers (Bank 
for International Settlements, 2011, p 6 par 
27) that does not have the sufficient strength 
(because they are not are not required to 
comply with the requirements of Basel) in 
order to increase profits, generates an exces-
sive liquidity in the market and big risk of 
collapse to the financial system, as the matter 
of facts occurred in the 2007 financial crisis.
Basel imposes to banks restrictions about 
capital and leverage as a way to back up 
banking and financial transactions aiming to 
protect the financial system from excess of 
liquidity: ‘(…) The build-up of leverage also 
has been a feature of previous financial crises, 
for example leading up to September 1998.’ 
(Bank for International, 2010 (rev 2011), p 4 
par 16)
These measures are in the bottom the final 
protection of the public deposits’ and the 
guarantee that the banks or other financial 
institutions, covered by Basel, are going to 
fulfil their obligations in the short and middle 
term. In this context liquidity is the most 
important item for financial markets. 
As professor Schwarcz explains very clear
‘(…) the loss in market value of investment 
securities held by banks and other financial 
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institutions (…) represents a liquidity pro-
blem, in that the financial markets have 
few buyers for these securities. Because the 
intrinsic value of these securities is much 
greater than their market value, these insti-
tutions are not necessarily insolvent in the 
traditional sense of a fair valuation of their 
assets being less than their liabilities. Some 
institutions may well be insolvent, though, 
in the term’s other (and less used) sense of 
being illiquid—being unable to meet their 
liabilities as they come due. This would 
occur where institutions need to sell inves-
tment securities to meet those liabilities, and 
the market price that would be received in 
the sale would be insufficient.’ (Schwarcz, 
2009, Paper Series No. 222, p 554)
One of the main reasons why the financial 
crisis became so severe was that the banking 
sectors of many countries had built up exces-
sive on- and off-balance sheet leverage. (Bank 
for International Settlements, 2010, p 1 par 4) 
This was accompanied by a gradual erosion of 
the level and quality of the capital base. (Ibid) 
At the same time, many banks were holding 
insufficient liquidity buffers. (Ibid) 
For that reason the financial system was 
not able to absorb the resulting systemic tra-
ding and credit losses nor could it cope with 
the re-intermediation of large off-balance 
sheet exposures that had built up in the 
shadow banking system. (Ibid) 
Sadly, the misuse of securitization was the 
origin of those problems. Securitization is a 
financial vehicle or instrument that has its 
advantages and disadvantages. Therefore it 
cannot be evil perse. In example, in the 2007 
financial crisis the subprime mortgage provi-
ded access to credit to borrowers that were 
risky and therefore have almost no access to 
any kind of credit to buy a house. (Schwarcz) 
‘This model worked brilliantly so long 
as home prices appreciated, as they had 
been doing for decades. The model also 
was consistent with the government’s 
strong encouragement of lenders to make 
mortgage loans to low income—and often 
“disproportionately minority”—borrowers.’ 
(Ibid p 550)
Nevertheless, although securitization had 
a big role in the financial crisis, it is wrong to 
blame the vehicle for the driver’s mistakes. 
Banks and other institutions (described in 
Basel III as shadow banking) used this finan-
cial instrument to raise more profits skipping 
Basel rationale by transferring the risk to 
investors, freeing up capital, and selling 
notes in the credit markets, while they were 
encouraging their employees to raise their 
own profit. 
In conclusion, in the financial crisis, an 
excessive leverage that was off the balance 
sheet, and therefore flooding the market with 
excessive none properly supported resources, 
together with a gradual weakening of the 
conditions of capital, produced that when the 
collaterals were on default, the system as a 
whole could not absolve the losses. (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2010 (rev 2011)).
2. Maximization of Shareholders’, 
Rating Agencies and employees’ 
Profits in detrimental of the 
Financial System and Basel 
principles
To the Maximization of the Bank’s and 
Financial Institution incentive, is added the 
system of revenue created and the continuous 
distribution of gains to shareholders, which 
decreased also the Banks’ liquidity and capital 
standards and made them even less resistant 
to the crisis. 
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Although the crisis was approaching and 
the liquidity problems starting to be noto-
rious, a number of banks ‘(…) continued 
to make large distributions in the form of 
dividends, share buy backs and generous 
compensation payments even though their 
individual financial condition and the outlook 
for the sector were deteriorating.’ (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2010 (rev 2011), 
par 27 p 6). This collective behaviour was, in 
some times, product of the desire to send to 
the markets the signal that the Banks was still 
strong enough and the business were going 
well, and thus avoid inquiries in the short 
term. 
This incorrect behaviour was criticized by 
Basel III since they consider that 
‘It is not acceptable for banks which have 
depleted their capital buffers to use future 
predictions of recovery as justification 
for maintaining generous distributions to 
shareholders, other capital providers and 
employees. These stakeholders, rather than 
depositors, must bear the risk that recovery 
will not be forthcoming.’ (Ibid p 55 par 126)
In first place the employees system of 
revenue was determine with the success of 
the securitization and the amount of notes 
that employee’s sale. (Ibid) Therefore they 
have an incentive to maximize their profit 
even if the financial instrument could cause 
detriment to the banks’ or the financial insti-
tution stability.
In the face of the crisis some of the sha-
reholders, capital providers and employees 
would like to obtain as much as possible 
before the Bank collapse, under a scenario 
where they probably would lose their jobs or 
investment. This makes the banks even more 
fragile.
In second place, rating agencies were paid 
by the originators to make an opinion. As they 
were contractors of the Banks usually, is very 
difficult to make an objective qualification 
against whoever is making the payment taking 
into account that rating agencies’ income 
depended on that qualification or opinion.
(See i.e. Bank for International Settlements, 
2011) For example in the Goldman Sachs 
case there was ‘(…) a great deal of evidence 
suggesting that rating agencies’ criteria for 
assessing ratings were conveniently adjusted 
to avoid losing market share’ (Munoz, 2010, 
page 415)
In this context, 
‘Because of the high proportion of their 
rating revenues derived from structured 
finance prior to the crisis, rating agencies 
may have been encouraged to rate highly 
complex products for which little or no 
historical performance data existed. For the 
same reason, the agencies may have failed to 
make their methodologies and related risks 
transparent enough (at least to investors), 
and to highlight the limits of ratings in mea-
suring risks beyond expected loss (CGFS 
(2005, 2008)).’ (Mitchell and Fender, 2009, 
p 31)
Nevertheless these incentives, investors 
over rely in rating agencies and made their 
investment decisions based on those opi-
nions, trusting them as experts, neglecting 
their duty of care. This behaviour in the end 
produced an inadequate measurement of 
the risk exposure and deepened the financial 
crisis. 
3. Consequences and teachings 
A lot of consequences followed the 
crisis, specially related with the future of 
securitization. 
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First, although there is still an incentive 
for investors to search better deals and notes 
in the capital markets, they have lost their 
confidence in securitization as a way to find 
good investments
‘More importantly, the general aversion 
to securitisation continues, particularly in 
the RMBS space. Serious questions about 
the quality of the assets underlying these 
products and the risks in the structures con-
tinue to make investment in securitisation 
products less attractive to investment mana-
gers.’ (Bank for International Settlements, 
2011, p 17)
Therefore an important financial instru-
ment for resource generation and allocation 
of cheap credit is now deemed as a risky and 
unreliable investment, making the access to 
the capital markets harder.
Secondly, the behaviour of the Banks has 
generated a regulatory reaction in which 
the freedom of contract, creation of new 
products and the financial system is hardly 
intervened by government control agencies 
under Basel III rules. The Basel III framework 
will be exposed in the next part of this work.
Thirdly, the crisis discovered that inves-
tors could still make bad decision even with 
enough information disclosure when they 
over rely in other participants and do not act 
in the markets with due diligence. (See i.e. 
Schwarcz, 2008, p 375-376)
Fourthly, securitization fail to reallocate 
risk to the parties that where more prepared 
(under Basel regulation) or more inclined to 
take higher risk. For instance, it took from 
the banks and another Basel’s regulated 
institutions burdens and passed them to 
unregulated financial agents and shadow 
bankers (Bank for International, 2011, p 6 par 
27) that were not capable to properly manage 
the risk, something that infected the whole 
financial system.(Ibid.) 
It also showed, once again, how just the 
pure market discipline is not sufficient to 
generate an stable financial market since the 
participants behaviour are determine by their 
own incentives in the market.(Ibid.) And 
that there are a lot other institutions that are 
doing the so called ‘shadow banking’ (Bank 
for International Settlements, 2011 p 6 par 
27) without the capital, leverage or buffer 
requirements, and have been used as vehicles 
to avoid regulatory burdens.(Ibid.)
Finally it discovered that the different kind 
of conflicting incentives and misalignments 
produced a 
‘(…) weakening of due diligence along the 
securitisation chain. This resulted in poorly-
underwritten assets being securitised by 
originators and those securities being bought 
by many investors who did not understand 
the extent of the risks they were taking on.’ 
(Bank for International Settlements, 2011, 
p 13)
In conclusion, it was not the securitization 
itself (as a financial instrument) the cause of 
the crisis or the incentives exposed by other 
authors,2 but the breach of Basel rationale 
by Banks, other financial institution, other 
shadow banking institutions, and other par-
2 See i.e. J Mitchell and I Fender, ´The future of 
securitisation: how to align incentives?´, BIS Quarterly 
Review, September 2009; Joint Forum, ´Report on 
Asset Securitization Incentives´, Bank for International 
Settlements, July 2011, p 9-18; D Munoz, ´SEC v 
Goldman Sachs and the new Wave of (Asset-Backed) 
Securities Litigation. What are the Arguments? What 
is at Stake?´, [2010] LFMR 413-420; S Schwarcs, ´The 
Future of Securitization´, (2009) 41 Conn L Rev 1315-
1325
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ticipants in the markets (including employees 
and Rating agencies) which were motivated 
by the maximization incentives.
III. Basel III the raction to the 
crisis
A.  Context of Basel III reforms
Basel III is conceived as a reaction to the crisis. 
In this context they are intending to make 
banks more resilient to another crisis, improve 
corporate governance in the banks, improve 
the transparency of the financial system and 
impose basic standards of risk management 
that would prevent another collapse. (Bank for 
International 2011, p 1 par 2)
The Basel Committee are really worried 
because financial crisis are happening more 
often 
‘Moreover, banking crises have been much 
more frequent than we would like, occurring 
on average about every 20 to 25 years in both 
industrial and emerging market countries. 
That is an annual probability of about 4-5%, 
which is simply unacceptable.’ (Walters, 
Bank for International Settlements, 2010, 
p. 1)
The crisis showed that banks have a para-
mount role in the stability of the international 
financial systems as they are key intermedia-
ries, allocate resources, generate markets and 
provide liquidity to deficit sectors. (Ibid) 
Basel III approach started analysing the 
excessive liquidity and the lacks in capital 
quality and buffers in the system. Therefore 
they adopted micro-prudential and macro-
prudential measures, which feed on each 
other, that hopefully would correct the mis-
takes that caused the crisis. (Ibid)
The micro-prudential measures to 
produce more resilience can be divided in 
five:
(i) The first measures are related with 
capital. Basically they create a unanimous 
definition and measures that increase the 
quality of the capital that the Banks and 
other financial institution must have to 
be more resilient. (Ibid)
(ii) Basel III linked the capital quality with 
the correct measurement of the risk, 
trying to make banks be more prepared. 
(Ibid)
(iii) In third place, they are increasing the 
amount of capital requirement for an 
effective absorption of the losses. (Ibid)
(iv) Fourthly accompanying the capital 
regulations’, the Basel Committee are 
changing the liquidity standards aiming 
that 
‘Banks will have to do more to self-
ensure against periods of stressed 
liquidity, just as they need to hold capi-
tal to absorb unexpected losses. Going 
forward, liquidity should not be viewed 
as a free good and therefore needs to be 
priced appropriately.’ (Ibid, p. 12)
(v) Finally, they are introducing risk 
measurement, management rules and 
higher disclosure standards to help 
control agencies and investors be aware 
of the real risks involved in the financial 
system (Ibid)
‘If a bank’s capital falls below the 2.5% 
conservation buffer, supervisors will 
constrain distributions and bonuses, 
addressing the collective action problem 
that prevailed before the crisis, namely 
market pressure to keep paying out 
dividends. This will ensure that capital 
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is conserved in a downturn and rebuilt 
during the upswing.’ (Ibis, p. 3)
As well, the macro prudential rules can be 
grouped into four:
(i) First, as a complement to the harder 
liquidity standards, they make clearer 
and higher the leverage ratios. (Ibid) 
(ii) Secondly, they are introducing a good 
times’ and bad times’ policy, which aim 
is that in good times the capital and the 
liquidity standards will be strengthened 
to be prepared for bad times 
(iii) Thirdly, they are taking focused measures 
related with important systemic banks. 
As the crisis showed the financial markets 
are interconnected and biggest banks 
can have a huge impact in the economy. 
Also those banks are in some cases 
taking advantage of smaller banks and 
institutions to achieve their capital and 
liquidity ratios. Therefore the regulations 
are harder for those Banks.(Ibid)
(iv) Finally, they made an extend chapter 
related with the application of the 
Basel III rules and the duties of the 
governmental control agencies to ensure 
that the rules are going to be adopted and 
followed. (Ibid)
In summary, the measures can be easily 
found in the next table
Source, Bank for International Settlements, ‘Basel Committee on Banking Supervision reforms - Basel III,’ www.bis.org/bcbs/
basel3/b3summarytable.pdf
Table 1
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B. Basel III: A Global Regulatory 
Framework for More Resilient 
Banks and Banking Systems 
1. Strengthening the Global Capital 
Framework (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2011 p 1 par 2)
The Capital framework is related with the 
capital of the banks that is supporting the 
its liabilities and determines its solvency in 
the market. Therefore is paramount that 
Banks have a good quality capital and that 
the definition of capital is uniform in order to 
ascertain banks true strength. (Ibid) 
To make clear the difference between 
capital minimum requirement and buffers, 
‘the regulatory minimum requirement is 
the amount of capital needed for a bank 
to be regarded as a viable going concern by 
creditors and counterparties’ (Bank for Inter-
national Settlements, 2010, p 1), while buffer 
‘(…) can be seen as an amount sufficient for 
the bank to withstand a significant downturn 
period and still remain above minimum 
regulatory levels.’ (Ibid p 1) The capital mea-
surement definition is in the paragraphs 52 to 
56 of the Basel III framework.
In relating with capital 
‘(…) the Committee in July 2009 completed 
a number of critical reforms to the Basel II 
framework. These reforms will raise capital 
requirements for the trading book and com-
plex securitisation exposures, a major source 
of losses for many internationally active 
banks. The enhanced treatment introduces 
a stressed value-at-risk (VaR) capital requi-
rement based on a continuous 12-month 
period of significant financial stress.’ (Bank 
for International Settlements, 2011, p 3 par 
12)
The rise of capital requirements are 
especially related with securitization and 
re-securitization. Since the crisis was triggered 
by the complex securitization transactions, 
the Committee enacted a higher capital 
requirement to the banks that are involved 
in these complex transactions and also (Ibid.) 
‘(…) introduces measures to strengthen the 
capital requirements for counterparty credit 
exposures arising from banks’ derivatives, 
repo and securities financing activities.’ (Ibid. 
p 3 par 13)
To achieve their goals of more resilient 
banks in the face of complex transactions, 
the Committee decided to introduce the 
following reforms in Basel III:
(i) The capital requirement for the bank 
must be determine using stressed inputs 
to be prepared for that scenario.
(ii) The capital requirements for banks are 
taking into account the possibility of 
the deterioration of the counterparties’ 
solvency. Therefore Basel III makes 
wider the credit valuation adjustment to 
prevent grater losses as experienced in 
the financial crisis. (Ibid.)
 ‘The Committee is raising counterparty 
credit risk management standards in 
a number of areas, including for the 
treatment of so-called wrong-way risk, i.e. 
cases where the exposure increases when 
the credit quality of the counterparty 
deteriorates. It also issued final additional 
guidance for the sound back-testing of 
counterparty credit exposures.’ (Ibid p 4 
par 14)
(iii) Related with the collateral, the Committee 
is requiring that banks, in calculating the 
regulatory capital requirement, spread 
over longer periods when they are 
involved in derivative transactions. (Ibid) 
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(iv) The Committee generates index to 
measure the interconnectivity of the 
banks in the financial system and 
developed incentives, in the way of 
higher standards of risk management, 
to encourage banks to reduce their 
exposures in the derivatives transactions. 
(Ibid)
2. Leverage ratio requirements
Capital requirements are not enough to pre-
vent a crisis. Even with solvent banks, if they 
lack in liquidity or the financial system has 
excess of it, it would cause a new crisis. For 
that reason the Committee imposed interna-
tional liquidity standards that complement 
the capital policies. (See Ibid p 9-10 par 43) 
Therefore, it is establishing minimum requi-
rements in development of the policy of good 
time’s savings to prepare for the bad times,
‘Governor King said, “The aim of the Liqui-
dity Coverage Ratio is to ensure that banks, 
in normal times, have a sound funding 
structure and hold sufficient liquid assets 
such that central banks are asked to perform 
only as lenders of last resort and not as 
lenders of first resort. While the Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio may represent a significant 
challenge for some banks, the benefits of a 
strong liquidity regime outweigh the asso-
ciated implementation costs.”’ (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2012)
The liquidity risk is understood under 
Basel III as 
‘(…) the risk that a counterparty, whether a 
participant or other entity, will have insuffi-
cient funds to meet its financial obligations 
as and when expected, although it may be 
able to do so in the future. (…) Liquidity 
problems have the potential to create sys-
temic problems, particularly if they occur 
when markets are closed or illiquid or when 
asset prices are changing rapidly, or if they 
create concerns about solvency.’ (Bank for 
international settlements, 2012, p 19)
This newest view changes the perspective 
of the banks in time. While in the financial 
crisis banks were motivated by a short term 
maximization of profits strategy, this new 
perspective make banks start to plan their 
business under a short, midst and long term 
stability parameters. 
Similarly, by introducing the leverage 
ratio regulation, the Committee is aiming to 
mitigate the risk of excessive liquidity in the 
market as one of the main predecessors of 
any financial crisis, (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2011) make the bank sector 
strong enough to bear any big shock in the 
financial systems (Ibid) and ‘(…) introduce 
additional safeguards against model risk 
and measurement error by supplementing 
the risk-based measure with a simple, 
transparent, independent measure of risk.’ ( 
Ibid p 4 par 16)
The leverage ratio reforms are more 
specific and developed in the Basel III: 
International Framework for Liquidity Risk 
Measurement. For that reason, it would be 
explain further in more detail.
3. Buffer management
The buffers regulation also response to the 
same good times savings for bad times policy. 
The task of the conservation buffer is that 
the banks holds the regulatory buffers as a 
minimum, but also is the regulation goal that 
banks go further the regulatory minimum to 
be prepared to a stress period, even in the 
absence of a credit bubble. (Ibid p 54 par 122-
123, See also p 7 par 31)
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The regime introduced by the Committee 
‘(…) will adjust the capital buffer range, 
established through the capital conservation 
mechanism outlined in the previous section, 
when there are signs that credit has grown 
to excessive levels. The purpose of the 
countercyclical buffer is to achieve the 
broader macro-prudential goal of protecting 
the banking sector in periods of excess 
aggregate credit growth.’ (Ibid p 7 par 30)
In the buffer section, Basel III established 
that is not acceptable to continue the pre-
crisis practice of distribution of capital on the 
face of a stress period. This behaviour, done 
by Banks to send the message of stability 
into the market, is describe as irresponsible 
because put the interests of shareholders over 
the depositors, in detriment of the financial 
system. (Ibid p 55 par 127)
4. Harder Credit Risk Management 
Standards
One of the main lessons from the financial 
crisis is that the participants in the financial 
and Capital markets did not manage the risk 
in a responsible way and some of them lack in 
understanding the risk that they were taking 
(i.e. investors and insurance corporations). 
Consequently the Committee is giving 
tools to the supervisors to ensure that when 
there is a transfer of the credit risk, it is pro-
perly secured and measured. For that reason 
banks are not going to be able to transfer the 
credit risk without paying for a security and, 
one way or another, assuming part of the risk 
that they are transferring to third parties. 
(Bank for International Settlements, 2011)
In the same way 
‘In addition to raising the quality and level of 
the capital base, there is a need to ensure that 
all material risks are captured in the capital 
framework. Failure to capture major on- and 
off-balance sheet risks, as well as derivative 
related exposures, was a key factor that 
amplified the crisis.’ (Bank for International 
Settlements, (2011, p 29 par 97)
To ensure the application of the new risk 
management standards, Basel III has given 
the supervisors other tools to track the res-
ponsible management of the risk. As a result 
supervisors are entitled to closely scrutinise 
any complex transaction which involve 
transfer of credit risk, power that was not 
contemplated before. (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2011)
In order to determine when banks are pro-
perly managing their credit risk, supervisors 
have to take into account the risk appetite, 
risk profile and market and macro-economic 
conditions and consider that (Bank for Inter-
national Settlements, ‘Core Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision’, 2012)
‘Credit risk may result from the following 
activities: on-balance sheet and off-balance 
sheet exposures, including loans and 
advances, investments, inter-bank lending, 
derivative transactions, securities financing 
transactions and trading activities. (…) 
Counterparty credit risk includes credit risk 
exposures arising from OTC derivative and 
other financial instruments.’ (Ibid p 46)
5. Transparency and disclosure
Basel III include in its regulation disclosure 
of information related with the capital, as an 
important element for the improvement of 
the corporate governance in banks. Moreover 
these disclosure regulations will help supervi-
sors in their duties.
Consequently Banks are required to 
disclose:
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(i) ‘full reconciliation of all regulatory 
capital elements back to the balance 
sheet in the audited financial statements;
(ii) separate disclosure of all regulatory 
adjustments and the items not deducted 
from Common Equity Tier 1 according 
to paragraphs 87 and 88;
(iii) a description of all limits and minima, 
identifying the positive and negative 
elements of capital to which the limits 
and minima apply;
(iv) a description of the main features of 
capital instruments issued;
(v) banks which disclose ratios involving 
components of regulatory capital 
(eg “Equity Tier 1”, “Core Tier 1” or 
“Tangible Common Equity” ratios) 
must accompany such disclosures with 
a comprehensive explanation of how 
these ratios are calculated.’ ( Ibid p 27 par 
91-93)
Equally, any information related with any 
note or financial vehicles shall be published 
in the Banks’ web page and those compo-
nents of capital that ‘are benefiting from the 
transitional provisions.’ (Ibid p 27 par 91-93)
6. Special rules for Biggest Banks to 
prevent systemic risk
Under an interconnected system context, 
bigger banks could increase and transmit 
any internal shocks to the financial system, 
causing macro-economic problems. Therefore 
Basel III developed certain rules that ensure 
that those important banks have the capacity 
to absorb those shocks beyond the minimum 
criteria under ongoing basis. (Ibid p 7 par 32)
In order to do that the Committee impo-
sed to the banks that 
(i) ‘capital incentives for banks to use central 
counterparties for over-the-counter 
derivatives;
(ii) higher capital requirements for trading 
and derivative activities, as well as 
complex securitisations and off-
balance sheet exposures (eg structured 
investment vehicles);
(iii) higher capital requirements for inter-
financial sector exposures; and
(iv) the introduction of liquidity requirements 
that penalise excessive reliance on short 
term, interbank funding to support 
longer dated assets.’ (Ibid p 7-8 par 33)
C. Basel III: International 
Framework for Liquidity Risk 
Measurement, Standards and 
Monitoring
The Committee made a different specific 
regulation involving liquidity and monitoring 
tools. This is a consequence of the importance 
of liquidity management to the financial 
system. 
‘The rapid reversal in market conditions 
illustrated how quickly liquidity can eva-
porate and that illiquidity can last for an 
extended period of time. The banking system 
came under severe stress, which necessitated 
central bank action to support both the 
functioning of money markets and, in some 
cases, individual institutions.’ (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2010, p 1 par 2)
As a consequence, Basel III formulated 
two liquidity metrics which are complemen-
tary (Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Net Stable 
Funding Ratio) and would help supervisors 
to establish that Banks are properly and 
prudently managing its liquidity in ongoing 
business.
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1. Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)
The Liquidity Coverage Ration aims to ensure 
that banks have enough assets easily conver-
tibles into cash that allows them to fulfilled 
their obligation in the short term (30 days 
period) assuming a highly stressed scenario. 
For that reason 
‘At a minimum, the stock of liquid assets 
should enable the bank to survive until Day 
30 of the stress scenario, by which time 
it is assumed that appropriate corrective 
actions can be taken by management and/or 
supervisors, and/or the bank can be resolved 
in an orderly way.’ (Ibid p 3 par 15)
The LCR is the minimum standard to 
ensure that the bank is prepared enough to 
survive 30 days in a stress period, (Ibid p 3 par 
15) and ‘stress period’ understood as those 
situations that are alike with those occurred 
in the 2007 crisis and which are described in 
the regulation. (See ibid p 4 par 17)
2. Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)
Net Stable Funding Ratio takes a longer 
perspective as a complement to the short 
term liquidity standard (LCR), ‘This metric 
establishes a minimum acceptable amount 
of stable funding based on the liquidity 
characteristics of an institution’s assets and 
activities over a one year horizon.’ (Ibid p 25 
par 119)
As Basel III searches for more resilient the 
banks, the Committee regulation pursuits 
Banks to be prepared to the most short, midst 
and long term stress scenarios ‘(…) away from 
short-term funding mismatches and toward 
more stable, longer-term funding of assets 
and business activities.’ (Ibid p 25 par 119)
As the other metrics, Net Stable Funding 
Ratio 
‘(…) aims to limit over-reliance on short-
term wholesale funding during times of 
buoyant market liquidity and encourage 
better assessment of liquidity risk across all 
on- and off-balance sheet items. In addition, 
the NSFR approach offsets incentives for 
institutions to fund their stock of liquid 
assets with short-term funds that mature 
just outside the 30-day horizon for that 
standard.’ (Ibid p 25 par 120)
Summarizing, the two main liquidity 
metrics are complementary and ensure more 
resilient banks while encourage them to adopt 
standards above the regulation and incentive 
banks to change their risk management 
perspective to a long term analysis.
3. Monitoring Tools
Committee create some monitoring tools to 
help the supervisors to have the necessary 
information, taking into account that the 
metrics cannot work by their own. As ‘These 
metrics capture specific information related 
to a bank’s cash flows, balance sheet structure, 
available unencumbered collateral and 
certain market indicators’, (Ibid p 31 par 137) 
is necessary that supervisors complement 
them with other inner metrics to ensure 
that the liquidity risk in local jurisdictions is 
following Basel III parameters. 
As a consequence Basel III discussed other 
metrics that the supervisor can use:
(i) ‘Contractual maturity mismatch 
(ii) Concentration of funding 
(iii) Available unencumbered assets
(iv) LCR by significant currency 
(v) Market-related monitoring tools’ (Ibid 
p31 par 139)
These tools are discussed in the paragraphs 
140-183 (Ibid) and provide a great scope for 
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supervisor to really evaluate the liquidity 
strength of banks.
D. Other Important Regulations 
Under Basel III scope
1. Corporate governance
Basel III introduced strong rules related 
with corporate governance to improve the 
risk management into banks and prevent 
detrimental collective actions as seen in the 
crisis3 
‘Given fundamental deficiencies in banks’ 
corporate governance that were exposed 
in the last crisis, a new Core Principle on 
corporate governance has been added in this 
review by bringing together existing corpo-
rate governance criteria in the assessment 
methodology and giving greater emphasis to 
sound corporate governance practices’ (Bank 
for International Settlements, 2012, p 2).
The principles of corporate governance 
in Basel III are structured as a complement 
to the disclosure and transparency policies, 
with the aim to recover the confidence of the 
investors in the financial system and correct 
the misbehaviour observed in the last crisis. 
(Ibid)
In order to do that the ‘Core Principles’ 
(Ibid) focus their rules in the supervision 
of risk management. The control agencies, 
in order to assess the risk, should take into 
account not only the financial metrics, but 
also the efficiency of the risk managers of the 
bank. 
3 This could be seen as a consequence of the 
financial crisis because the personnel of the 
banks were acting motivated by their inner greed 
and encouraged by the revenue system as explain 
before
Therefore an active, early and constant 
supervision is expected by Basel III to grant 
the regulatory frame work application. ‘This 
risk-based process targets supervisory resou-
rces where they can be utilised to the best 
effect, focusing on outcomes as well as pro-
cesses, moving beyond passive assessment of 
compliance with rules.’ (Ibid p 4)
By doing this, it is expected by the Com-
mittee that the operational risk4 would be 
reduced.
2. Supervision and Financial 
Innovation 
One of the most significant advances in 
Basel III is that the Committee foreseen the 
possibility of the creation of other innovative 
vehicles that, as securitization in the crisis, 
could be used to jump over the Basel rules, 
and so alert supervisors about this issue and 
imposed banks disclosure duties8 (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2012)
‘(…) banks should analyse and document 
the economic substance of credit protection 
4 ‘(…) which is the risk that deficiencies in 
information systems or internal processes, human 
errors, management failures, or disruptions 
from external events will result in the reduction, 
deterioration, or breakdown of services provided 
by an FMI? These operational failures may lead 
to consequent delays, losses, liquidity problems, 
and in some cases systemic risks. Operational 
deficiencies also can reduce the effectiveness of 
measures that FMIs may take to manage risk, for 
example, by impairing their ability to complete 
settlement, or by hampering their ability to 
monitor and manage their credit exposures. (…)’. 
Bank for international settlements, Committee on 
Payment and Settlement Systems and Technical 
Committee of the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions, ‘Principles for financial 
market infrastructures’ (2012) www.bis.org/publ/
cpss101a.pdf, p 20
transactions that have unusually high-cost 
or innovative features to assess the degree 
of risk transference and the associated 
impact on the bank’s overall capital ade-
quacy. Banks should bring to the attention 
of their supervisor any innovative positions 
which fall under this guidance to ensure 
they are subject to appropriate prudential 
treatment. The analysis also should specify 
how the transaction aligns with the bank’s 
overall risk management strategy.’ (Bank 
for International Settlements, 2011)
In this context any new financial instru-
ment would be closely supervised to prevent 
its misuse.
3. Implementation
Finally Basel III generates some tools for 
monitoring the frame work implementation. 
One example of those is the ‘Progress report 
on Basel III implementation’ (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2012) whereby the 
countries that are part of Basel has to report 
the advances in Basel II, Basel II.5 and Basel 
III for the Committee’s’ review.
Conclusion 
The incentive of maximization of profits 
for banks and other participants are always 
present in the financial markets and is always 
going to be in an opposite direction of Basel 
rationale, at least in a short term perspective 
‘Safer banking will mean lower returns on 
bank equity, but returns will be more stable 
and more sustainable – and long-term inves-
tors will welcome this.’ (Caruana, 2012)
In this context ‘In maximising their pri-
vate benefits, individual financial institutions 
may rationally choose outcomes that, from a 
system-wide level, are sub-optimal because 
they do not take into account these [negative] 
externalities’ (Ibid p 1-2 par 3) as for example 
the incentives. 
Although Basel III is a great tool to control 
those incentives, it is insufficient to recover 
the investors’ confidence and control other 
financial institutions that, as seen in the last 
crisis, were acting as shadow banks 
‘Likewise, ad hoc actions taken in that crisis 
by the Federal Reserve to protect financial 
institutions, such as Bear Stearns, might 
be helpful but are still insufficient because 
they fail to address the underlying problem: 
financial-market collapse due to loss of 
investor confidence’ (Schwarcz, ‘Systemic 
Risk’, 2008, Research Paper No. 163, p 248).
Additionally, even Basel principles and 
rationale exist before the crisis and were 
followed by Basel III, those principles and 
rationales were cleverly evaded using other 
financial and no-financial institution in the 
crisis and sophisticated financial instruments 
that were out of the scope of Basel.
‘Moreover, the moral hazard costs associa-
ted with implicit guarantees derived from 
the perceived expectation of government 
support may amplify risk-taking, reduce 
market discipline and create competitive 
distortions, and further increase the proba-
bility of distress in the future. As a result, 
the costs associated with moral hazard add 
to any direct costs of support that may be 
borne by taxpayers.’ 
Biggest Banks are more affected by 
this moral hazard because its bankruptcy 
represents a macro-economic problem that 
governments cannot allow, so they are more 
inclined to invent another way for avoiding 
Basel.
In this order of ideas, the risk that those 
incentives cause another crisis is still on. For 
that reason the prevention of a future finan-
cial crisis and the mitigation of its negative 
effects would depend on the seriousness of the 
commitment of the banks and other financial 
institution with Basel III and the effective 
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